THE CONCEPTION OF GOD QUA ENERGEIA IN ARISTOTLE *
H. Nur ERKIZAN
In Aristotle living organisms, inanimate realities, and the phenomena of sensing and knowing are described as activities.1 However, the understanding of being as activity requires a deep investigation into the subject, because the activity of being at each level differs from the others. For example, in the Metaphysics, the Absolute Subject of Absolute Energeia emerges as the Perfect Being.2* In this sense, we can compare other types of activities with it, namely the Absolute Energeia. However, this is not the primary concern of the present study. On the contrary, it aims to find out what it means to be a god in Aristotle3 philosophical system. But, before going any futher, I would like to point out briefly that in Aristotle, understanding of being as activity removes any sort of object-subject distinction. For the Perfect Being is activity and perfect activity is the Perfect Being.4 Therefore, there is no such entity which is said to be active. In other words, the thing and its activity are inseparable from each other. Now let us state how the Perfect Being is conceined by Aristotle:
I. It is potent (dynatos) 5
II. It has no matter whatsoever 6
III. It is pure activity (energeia)7
IV. Its activity is unchangeable 8
V. It is the perfect being qua energeia.9 (As such it is the primary substance in the absolute sense)
I now would like to deal with each attribute of the Perfect Being in some details.
I. It Is Potent: The term potency (dunamis) has many different meanings in Aristotle. Although there is a chapter devoted to it in the Metaphysics, it does not clarify each different meaning of potency in relation to each specific subject. But, nevertheless this does not appear to prevent us from getting the essential meaning of it. As I have said, the term “potency” has many applications in Aristotle's philosophy but the point remains clear that the concept of potency is understood as an ontological principle in essence. Alexander of Aphrodisias says that in the sense of being able to be affected by any other thing or by itself qua other cannot be thought of God; for it is neither.10 And in virtue of that, God is said to be the most potent in the absolute sense. However, when one thinks only of the sense of potency which is applied to changeable beings, one gets oneself into real difficulties. For in this sense it is thought of those kinds of beings which are composed of matter and form, and it implies actuality and potentiality distinction.11 But one should not forget that the term has different applications in relation to specific subjects. So God is the most potent being but not impotent, for it cannot be affected by any other thing.12 Therefore, being potent in the case of God is "not to be affected". This ontological principle establishes the ontological independency of God but qua being the ontological Subject in the sense of absoluteness. It defines the state of God from the ontological point of view. For that reason, to say that God is neither perishable nor changeable get its right meaning in the sense of being absolutely potent, 13 Nevertheless one mignt argue by saying that although it is possible to eliminate any sort of potentiality from God through distinguishing, the different senses of the term dunamis there would still be a problem which is of the nature of divine thinking activity. Let us grant that God is potent in the sense of not to be affected by anything else except by itself and it needs nothing other than itself to exist and to think. However, there will still be problem which is of the possibilty of divine thinking without including change. For, let us assume that God were to think two things or just itself. In any case its mind would be in motion even if it were to think that it is just what it is. Thus it seems that defining God as the most potent being does not itself troubles but the real diffulty lies in explaining the nature of divine thinking activity without causing change in God. So it appears that the source of the problem is not ontologiacal but epistemological one.
II. It Includes No Matter:
According to Aristotle there is an internal relation between matter and potentiality. He also relates his conception of contrariety to matter and potentiality. Thus he says in the Metaphysics that :
...there is nothing contrary to that which is primary; for all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist potentially; ...but what is primary has no contrary. *14
Aristotle thought that matter is the source of contingency. That which has matter may not be what it is expected to be. In addition to this, that which has matter has also its contrary. In essence, being potentially and having contraries are due to matter.15 Therefore, the source of contingency lies in being material or having matter. Although it is a complicated subject, I mean matter and contingency, one thing is certain that the Perfect Being or God has no matter whatsoever. In virtue of that it has no contrary. It is imperishable, unchangeable, and eternal for this reason. In investigating the source of eternal movement, Aristotle links being eternal with being immaterial. He says in the Metaphysics, at 1071b 15-25 that:
Further, even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may be possible not be. There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality. Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal. *
Being absolutely potent and immaterial remove any sort of possible potentialities from the Perfect Being in the sense of changing for the best or worst.17 For in either way its absolute independency - I mean ontological and functional - would be damaged. But, Aristotle insists that, there is no change in it because The Perfect Being is perfect in the absolute sense of being perfect. Therefore, it is independent of anything which might imply any sort of completion or development. In the case of humans , completion or perfection would require a whole life, for this kind of perfection takes place in the environment of change; but for God there is no change or development in any sense.18 And its independency is both ontological and functional. Thus Aristotle eliminates any kind of change from his conception of God. The remaining task is now to show that though God is changeless he is not inactive. 19
III. It Is Pure Activity:
It appears that the importance of Book XII of the Metaphysics has been accepted by everybody but the formulation of the Prime Mover as pure activity has been subjected to almost regular misinterpretation. The word which have led to confusions is the term akinetos. Without careful and critical attention to the importance of this term, one is inclined to envisage the Prime Mover as inert, or static in the ordinary sense. Nevertheless, it appears that it is almost unimaginable to think that that which is said to be active should yet be "static". For, Aristotle’s conception of being as activity points to a very radical understanding of the world. Therefore, something which is said to be activity yet inert is not something that could be understood without changing our way of thinking. 20
Aristotle says that the Unmoved Mover is pure activity and yet there is no change in it. It is perfect, it is life, and it is perfect happiness. It is the principle of movement and, everything is dependent on it but, it is absolutely independent. It knows what it is itself and it is eternally blissful.21 I now want to raise two questions here: what was the essential point in Aristotle's mind in the formulation of Perfect Being as pure activity? How does activity (energeia) differ from mere ordinary movement (kinesis)?In Aristotle anything said to exist potentially is in essence imperfect - no matter what it will be later on. In other words, for Aristotle, creation of perfection by completion carries its imperfection within it.22 For example, contemplation, which is said to be perfect happiness for human beings in essence could only take place in its imperfect form within us. For we could enjoy it for a short period of time.23 As opposed to that God is always in the same state. For from the ontological point of view we are not able to do so. Therefore, our ontological status prevent us from being godlike but not of course developing the divine element which is said to exist in us. In virtue of that, I come to say, the formulation of God as pure activity means the radical constitution of the Subject. God is neither subject to time nor any ethical-religous requirements.24 Its independence is absolute. Especially in the Hegelian philosophy Absolute Subject has to wait ages, has to be the most patient of all in order to be realized. On the other hand, in Aristotle, God is always in the same state. There is nothing else to be changed or developed or yet to be known. As we are told in the Nicomachean Ethics(1154 b 26-27)... “there is not only an activity of movement but an activity of immobility...” By that he tries to show us that some actions are processes and directed towards further purposes but there are other actions which are "immobile actions" or "immobile activities" and are complete and whole in every instant.26 In other words they do not require further actions for further perfection such as learning and teaching. One learns step by step and this leads to the full grasping of a point. But once one grasps some concept he or she does not become inactive or static. On the contrary he/she who finally understands a principle, is in the act of grasping, precisely active. Therefore being active does not mean to strive for something else but to have or to live in what is wanted. 27
IV. Its Activity Is Unchangeable: According to Aristotle there are fundamental differences between movement (kinesis) and activity (energeia). Therefore, it is important to point out what they are. For, it appears that we, contemporary minds, have lost this distinction. As a direct result of this, movement is opposed to inertia. But Aristotle distinguishes energeia from kinesis and he thought that this is of profound importance. Although energeia is complete in each instant and contains its telos within it, kinesis requires to be completed.28 In other words, kinesis is not completed all at once but is extended in time and it is directed toward its end. However, this distinction can be applied only to those beings which are subject to change. But in the case of the Unmoved Mover, Aristotle attributes to God not only activity but pure activity: it is a pure activity which excludes any sort of coexistence with kinesis. the Unmoved Mover is activity and it is not in process for further development; yet it is not inert. 29
V. It Is The Perfect Being Qua Energeia:
Aristotle says in Metaphysics at 1072 a 24 –26 that: “And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and activity.” What we infer from what has been said above is that the first principle is an activity. In connection with the constant coming-to-be of things it is the Perfect Being that everything else endeavours to imitate. And in De Generatione et Corruptione we are told that:
...but not all things can possess 'being', since they are too far removed from the 'originative source'. God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that 'coming-to-be' should itself 'come-to-be perpetually' is the closest approximation to eternal being30
Here we see that God is imitated but is not an imitator. A thing which wants to be active, strives to be like pure activity, is necessarily in motion. And for example, this striving might take a whole life-time. Therefore, one has to distinguish the levels of activity as well as the quality of the activity.31 Human activities are different from the activity of God not only because the former emerges in time, but also because their object is outside, it is God. Therefore even activities, though "finite" ones, have to remain conditioned. Thinking, understanding, loving, knowing are activities, but nevertheless they are not wholly immanent in us: we are bound to turn our eyes toward the "external world" and this is the reason of imperfection. On the other hand, God has no object to turn to or to have and there is nothing else as perfect as it is which it might want to be. It is not completed but is complete. Consequently, its activity is changeless in virtue of its non-completed completion. 32 Developing, progressing are the words which imply imperfection for God as opposed to changeable beings. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle says between the lines 1072 b 13 and 30 that:
On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its activity is also pleasure (and for this reason are waking, perception and thinking most pleasant and hope and memories are so on account of these. And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense.
And life also belongs to God; for the activity (energeia) of thought is life, and God is that activity, (energeia) Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks ( since it is the most excellent of things ) and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.
I also would like to say that the First Principle is not an object of any sort. In other words, it is not a mind or an intelligence which thinks. On the contrary it is activity, it is thinking. However, human thinking differs from divine thinking . For our object of knowledge is not within us. Our mind is an empty block. It has the power to become the activity of another. The human mind is finite and it seeks to appropriate the other.34 More correctly, it is identified with the other. As opposed to this, the Unmoved Mover is perfect and it thinks of itself. However, this thinking is not of knowing itself because, it does know itself. There is no gap between its object of knowledge and itself . It is identified with itself There is nothing to prevent it from that because it is of that nature, it is identical with itself, without any admixture of matter. And as a result of conception of God and its nature in that way unity and individuality of the Perfect Subject, God is profoundly established. Thus, God, for Aristotle, exists as pure activity. It is not corruptible, but lives eternally and it is abiding.
NOTES:
1. ETZWILER, J., “Being as Activity: A Process Interpretation”, International Philosophical Quarterly, 1978, vol, 18, pp: 311-334.
2. Metaphysics: 1071 b 20. It would be useful to look at De Anima, III. 5 where Aristotle says that the essence of nous poietikos is energeia, particulary 430 a17-19.
3. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see: KOSMAN, L. A., Divine Being and Divine Thinking in Metaphysics Lambda, Proceedings of Boston Colloqium In Ancient Philosophy, 1987, vol 3, pp: 165-288
4. KOSMAN, L.A., “Substance, Being and Energeia”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosopy, 1984, vol 2, pp: 121-149.
5. Metaphysics: 1073 a 5-10. It is rather surprsing that the passage in question has recevied almost no attention. However, I believe that what Aristotle says there has profound importance for his conception of god. He thinks that nothing finite can have an infinite power. And if god is not finite there is not nothing to prevent us from saying that it is potent or it has infinite power. Nevertheless translation of the Greek term dunamis certainly poses a number of problems especially for those who do not know Greek. For example Ross translates the term dunamis as power (1073 a 7) but Tredennick as potentiality. And reading dunamin apeiron as infinite power or infinite potenriality are definitely problematic. One also could go back to Physics of similar discussion for instance 266a24-b6. And there are innumerous studies on the subject-matter. Some of the most important ones are the following:
1) Erkızan, H. Nur., Energeia, Nous and Non-Discursive Thinking in Aristotle (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis), University of Bristol, 1997. It also includes almost a full bibliograpy on the subject.
2) Charlton, W., “Aristotelian Powers”, Phronesis, Phronesis, 1987, 32, 277-289.
3) Polansky, R., “Aristotle’s Demarcation of Senses of Energeia in Metaphysics IX. 6, Ancient Philosophy, 1983, 3i 160-170.
4) Kosman, L. A., Substance, Being and Energeia; Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 1984, 2, 212-149.
6. Metaphysics 1075 b 20-25.
7. Metaphysics: 1071 b 20
8. Metaphysics: 1074 b 23-33. However, for a fuller discussion see: Metaphysics XII. 7 and XII.9.
9. Metaphysics: 1071 b 20-21.
10. ARSLAN, Ahmet, Aristoteles: Metafizik, Sosyal Yayınlar, İstanbul, 1996, pp: 262-263.
11. Metaphysics: 1048 b 37-49 a 5; 1074 b 28-29; 1017 b 10-14; 1070 a 9-12; Physics: 191a 27-31
12. Metaphysics: V. 12; 1073 a 5-10.
13. Metaphysics: 1073 a 10-12.
14. Metaphysics:1075 b 20-25
15. Compare De Anima 429 a 24-25 with 1074 b 38-75 a 1.
16. See: GUTHRIE, W. K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy: VI Aristotle: An Encounter, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp: 259-261.
17. Metaphysics: XII. b and 7 where Aristotle says that the Unmoved Mover is activity and without matter.
18. Metaphysics: 1074 b 33-35. According to Aristotle the Unmoved Mover thinks itself, divine thinking, as opposed to human thinking, is complete.
19. KOSMAN, A. L. “Aristotle’s Definition of Motion”, Phronesis, vol 14, 1969, pp: 60-62.
20. LEAR, J., Aristotle: the Desire to Understand, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp: 1-14.
21. Metaphysics: 1072 b 13-30.
22. Metaphysics: 1048 b 20-35.
23. Metaphysics: 1074 b 28-29 and Nicomachean Ethics: 1178 b 23-24.
24. WEDIN, M.V., Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988, pp: 260-265.
25. Nicomachean Ethics: 1154 b 26-27
26. Nicomachean Ethics: X. 7-8.
27. Aristotle says kinesis is get confused with energeia, but in fact they are completely different from each other. Nicomachean Ethics: 1154 b 17-20.
28. See BLAIR’s very importand article on the subject: BLAIR, G., the Meaning of Energeia and Entelecheia in Aristotle, International Philosophical Quarterly, vol 7, 1967, p: 102-107. Ackrill, J.L. Aristotle’s Distinction Between Energeia and Kinesis (in: New Essays on Plato and Aristotle) London, 1965, 121-141.
29. For example, Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia. Nicomachean Ethics: 1177 b 19-26.
30. De Generatione et Corruptione: 336 b 30-34 .
31. For a very good discussion on whether divine and human noetic activity are the same, see: KAHN, C., “Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle’s Psychology”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1966, vol 48, pp: 43-81.
32. Metaphysics: 1072 a 19 ff.
33. Metaphysics: 1072 b 13-30.
34. WEDIN, M.V., Mind and Imagination in Aristotle , Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988. pp: 160-229.
Bibliography
1. ACKRILL, J. L. “ Aristotle’s Distinction Between Energeia and Kinesis, (İn: New Essays on Plato and Aristotle), London, 1965, 121-141.
2. ELLROD, F., “Energeia and Process in Aristotle”, International Philosophical Quarterly, 1982, vol 22, pp; 175-181.
3. DEVEREUX, D.T., “Aristotle on the Active end Contemplative Lives, Philosophy Research Archives, 1977, vol 3, pp: 834-44.
4. HAGEN, C. T., “ The Energeia Kinesis Distinction and Aristotle’s Theory of Action, Journal of History of Philosophy, 1984, vol 22, pp: 263-80.
5. HOFFMAN, W.M., “ Aristotle’s Logic of Verb Tenses” Journal of Critical Analysis, 1976, vol b, pp: 89-99.
6. MERLAN, P., “Aristotle’s Unmoved Movers“, Traditio, 1936, vol, pp: 1-30.
7. OWENS, J., “Aristotle: Motion as Actuality of the Imperfect”, Paideia: Special Aristotle Issue, 1978, pp: 120-132.
8. RYLE, G., The Concept of Mind, London, 1949.
9. RITTER, W.M.E., “Why Aristotle Invented the Word Entelecheia”, Quarterly Review of Biology, 1932, vol 7, pp: 377-404.
10. KENNY, A., The God of the Philosophers, Oxford, 1979.
ÖZET
Bu çalışma Aristoteles’in Tanrı anlayışını yeni bir kavranım ışığında ele alıp incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda o bizzat Aristoteles’in kendisi tarafından oluşturulmuş olan energeia teriminin anlamı üzerinde önemle durur; çünkü terimin kendisi durağanlığı, hareketsizliği ifade etmese de o kinesis’ten, yani hareketten ayrılır. İşte bu çalışma Aristoteles’in Tanrıyı nasıl oluş ve yok oluş alanından çıkararak, Onu mutlak anlamda bir energeia varlığı olarak kavradığını göstermeye çalışır.
HATİCE NUR ERKIZAN (Yrd. Doç. Dr.)
Muğla Üniversitesi,
Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi
Felsefe Bölümü
Tel: 0 (252) 214 96 89